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Abstract

Geographical political economy increasingly scrutinises the socio-spatial contexts for brands and branding.
Less understood is the influence of subcultures - neo-tribal groups sharing passions, a leisure pursuit or
practice - on enterprise formation and the pathways through which brands emerge, trading on perceived
authenticity. Subcultural contexts, we argue, unleash distinctive trajectories of enterprise formation,
reputation-building, value-creation, global expansion and accumulation, and ultimately destruction. Here we
focus on how particular subcultural values - of authenticity, competition, risk-taking, and active participation
in 'scenes' - interact with capitalist growth dynamics, and where over time and space such intersections bring
brands unstuck. Using the case of surfing subculture and collapse of corporate surf enterprises (Quiksilver,
Billabong), we theorise subcultural brand value creation and its interaction with financialized expansion,
culminating in destructive contradictions. Subcultural enterprises with 'authentic', 'back-of-the van' origins
convert subcultural values of credibility, localism, risk-taking, and scene participation into brand value.
Trading on place-origins and subcultural authenticity, enterprises expanded in two phases. First by widening
distribution using specialist 'surf ' retailers, and second by offshoring production, public floating, and debtfinancing brand acquisitions and massive retail expansion. Dictates of shareholders and investment banks
spurred market saturation, and high-volume/low-quality goods. Surfing's cherished insouciance gave way to
unhinged expansionism and unmanageable debt. The subcultural authenticity that spawned brand popularity
was undermined, amplifying financial risk. Disenchanted consumers who once co-created successful brands
also co-destroyed them. As subcultural brands proliferate, geographical political economy must be attentive to
subcultures as spawning-grounds for enterprises with accompanying limits to market growth,
(dis)connections, and values.
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1. Introduction
In September 2015, multinational surf brand Quiksilver (ZQK, New York Stock Exchange)
began Chapter 11 federal bankruptcy proceedings in a Delaware court (U.S. Bankruptcy Court
15-11880). Within three years, Quiksilver’s annual revenue had fallen 30% and debt had
increased beyond US$800 million. Fellow multinational surfing label Billabong (BBG,
Australian Stock Exchange) was also in crisis, having just faced a messy US$350 million
restructure in 2014. The founders of Rip Curl, the third of the ‘Big Three’ global surf brands,
proposed and then abandoned a A$400 million sale amidst falling profitability, leading to the
high profile exit of its Chairperson (Greenblat 2014). The restructuring of these global brands
encompassed take-overs by private equity consortiums, dilution of shareholder ownership, major
losses for creditors, the fire sale of subsidiary brands, and large job cuts across production
networks. Once at the core of a seemingly ever-expanding international market for clothing and
apparel, surf megabrands became pariahs of international retailing, stripped of their ‘cool’ cachet,
and subject to continual admonition from business analysts and commentators.
Much broadsheet commentary surrounded the crisis of corporatised surf enterprises. It
largely interpreted collapse through frames familiar in international political economy. Blamed
were spiralling debts, contracting consumer spending following the global financial crisis (GFC),
merry-go-round volatility within corporate boardrooms, and poor management strategy leading to
a loss of legitimacy within capital markets (cf. Khouri 2015). Such narratives are consistent with
economic geographic analyses of the debt-financed global expansion of transnational firms and
accompanying crises (Fagan and Le Heron 1994; Wood et al. 2016). But they only partially
explain the collapse of corporate surf brands. Here we seek to provide a fuller account that
integrates a geographical political economic analysis of financialized growth with factors arising
from the subcultural origins of enterprises themselves: origin/formation narratives, value creation
and destruction, and subsequent collapse not just in debt and risk but also brand legitimacy. We
emphasise interactions and tensions between market logics of global expansion and capital
accumulation and grounded subcultural values of authenticity, risk-taking, competition, and
social connections within subcultural ‘scenes’.
Values that infuse subcultures include origin narratives: enterprises having originated
from within a genuine place-based ‘scene’ of participants espousing countercultural practices.
These are groups of intense and passionate consumers with shared interests or pursuits,
sometimes referred to as ‘neotribes’ (Cova et al. 2007). Such countercultural values provide
profitable opportunities for enterprises that stem from subcultural origins, such as music, fashion,
and surfing, and underpin brand value creation as they scale-up from localised, grass-roots
beginnings to global production and distribution networks (cf. Yeung 2014). Increasingly,
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geographical political economy is scrutinizing the socio-spatial contexts of brands and branding –
including strategies to market commodities via origin narratives and place connections (cf. Pike
2015; Yeung 2016; Crewe 2017). But rarely integrated into economic geographies of brands and
branding is the influence of subcultural contexts and values. Indeed, subcultures are rarely taken
seriously within academic economic geography (for exceptions see: Bader and Scharenberg
2010; Lange and Burkner 2015). Examining the case of collapse among corporatised surf brands,
we theorise how dynamics relating to global expansion, financialisation, and accumulation
pathways interact with subcultural value creation and brand authenticity to unleash destructive
tensions.
Supporting our argument is empirical detail collected within a broader research project
concerned with crises in the surf industry. Between 2008 and the present we have pursued a
longitudinal study of the surf industry. More than 200 interviews with key actors in the industry
have been conducted to date, collecting 600 hours of audio recordings. These have included
direct employees of the Big Three surf brands, contracted surfboard manufacturers, surf clothing
designers, apparel retailers, surf media figures and representatives from the Surf Industry
Manufacturers Association (SIMA). Our analysis below draws on these sources. Additionally,
historical information was collected from archives held at the Surf Heritage Foundation
(California), Surf World Museums (Victoria and Queensland) and Bishop Museum of Polynesian
Cultural Heritage (Honolulu). Quantitative data on Quiksilver and Billabong were compiled
using publicly available financial reports statements to investors (2005-2015). Transcripts from
34 investor meetings with Billabong (2001-2015) and Quiksilver (1997-2015) executives were
also analysed. As Rip Curl is privately owned, financial information was triangulated using print
media, company statements, and our own interviews with employees. From these empirical
observations, a picture emerges of how global expansion, debt, and risk interacted with the
subcultural groundings of surf brands.
Accumulation pathways for surf brands emerged from the possibilities of selling a ‘cool’
lifestyle and subversive semiotic meanings to consumers beyond the subculture (Lawler 2012).
Surfing’s connotations as care-free, insouciant and countercultural offered a potent commercial
package (Warren and Gibson 2014). Subcultural commodification occurred in successive waves:
first in Hawai‘i, where it accompanied tourism marketing, and second in California where it was
used to promote hotels and real estate (Warshaw 2010; Shaw and Menday 2013). Then in the
1950s the globalisation of surfing intensified, via American music, film and television shows,
spreading to Australia, Europe and beyond. From the 1960s, internationalisation enabled nascent
equipment, fashion and apparel industries to emerge. Our empirical analysis elucidates such
phases, focusing especially on the latter period, when local surfing subcultures bred enterprises
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that became iconic brands, and then multinational corporations. Early entrepreneurs from
Australian coastal towns developed equipment and apparel brands, establishing early distribution
and retail networks. Rarity value for surf products accrued through restricted availability. As
brand reputation propagated, licensing agreements, distribution rights and retail networks
expanded into more locations and outlet types (including shopping malls). Surfing’s insouciance,
competitive spirit, and ‘culture of risk’ (Walton and Shaw 2016), permeated enterprise strategies
and expansion. The balance of profits derived not just from core equipment (surfboards,
wetsuits), but increasingly from general fashion items – t-shirts, sunglasses, swimwear – with
wider consumer appeal. Debt-financing, vertical integration, standardisation, acquisition and
diversification strategies followed. By 2005, Quiksilver and Billabong were billion-dollar
enterprises, listed on stock exchanges in New York and Sydney. Surfing subculture grew to
underpin a US$13 billion global industry (Global Industry Analysts 2016). Once ‘grounded’ in
subversive counterculture, surf enterprises became highly financialised corporations with
standardised production, marketing, and distribution networks.
However, the deepening integration into global circuits of financial capital, product
homogenisation, and pursuit of endless growth to satisfy shareholders, progressively undermined
the subcultural origin narratives, and values of surfing credibility and participation that were key
to market value. Alongside faltering legitimacy (cf. Wood et al. 2016), corporatised surf brands
experienced declining sales, falling profit margins, and unserviceable levels of debt. Capitalist
principles of market expansion, economies of scale, and increasing sales volumes collided with
anti-establishment values, the need for authenticity, and origin narratives that connected brands to
local subcultural scenes (cf. Driver 2011; Beaumont and Brown 2015). Corporatisation and debtfuelled expansion approached and then exceeded certain limits, jeopardizing the enterprises
financially, but also undermining subcultural legitimacy. The collapse of brand authenticity in
turn afforded opportunities for renaissance localism, and space in the market for new niche
players with more credible subcultural connections. Through the case of surfing, we explicate
broader implications for understanding subcultural origin narratives, enterprise formation, brand
value, and expansion under global capitalism.
After surveying and linking relevant literatures on the economic geography of brands and
commercial salience of subcultures our analysis is structured in two main parts. First, from
research on the surfing industry (with workers, firms, and consumers) we trace accumulation
pathways, examining how waves of subcultural commodification and marketisation evolved.
Packaged into clothing, apparel and fashion products, surfing came to embody a highly profitable
industry. Adding to critiques of orthodox economic knowledges predicated on naturalised market
relations, we examine the ‘market shape’ surfing subculture spawned (Polanyi 1977). Subcultural
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groundings shaped brand values, market strategies, and initial expansion (cf. Jessop and Sum
2010). Subcultural values and meanings permeated the entire production system: from the design
and manufacture of clothing/apparel, to commercial business dealings and retail stores selling
branded goods. Early international expansion tapped into emerging specialist surf retail networks.
Surf firms were initially created and led by surfers, whose passion for the sport, connections to
the subculture and proclivities for risk-taking were atypical to the corporate managerial class. The
result was a collection of brands reaching a certain market size that held subcultural credibility in
tension with growing geographic and market reach.
Second, we explore interactions between the subcultural groundings of enterprises and
processes of capitalist expansion, debt financing and risk. While acknowledging the global
financial crisis impacted negatively upon surf brands and fashion retail (cf. Crewe 2017), we
detail longer-run contingences and outcomes, emanating from the subcultural contexts of surfing
brands. Our argument is the roots of collapse stretch further back, to historical attempts to
commercialise surfing, and to the place-and time-specific evolution of subcultural enterprises.
We trace the market tactics of surf enterprises following early international distribution, including
public listings, and pursuit of vertical integration, acquisition, diversification, and high-volume
growth strategies. Although consistent with the subculture’s risk-taking ethos, such tactics
strayed from values of authenticity, localism and scene participation that underpinned the identity
and legitimacy of each brand. Increasingly, surf firms mimicked tactics of mainstream
department stores, including homogenising product design globally (diluting local subcultural
variants) and debt-financing expansion into mass-retail, hoping for dominant market share.
Corporatised firms dependent on subcultural origin narratives for value creation became lockedin to obligations of market expansion, compound growth and shareholder dividends – all of
which undermined subcultural authenticity. At its heart, surfing remained subcultural, where
credibility equated to pursuit of oceanic lifestyles (Lawler 2012), and links to coastal geographic
origins (Warren and Gibson 2014). After floating, appointments of mainstream retail executives
and global market saturation, surf brands witnessed a collapse in legitimacy and thus value. First
surfers, as key subcultural gatekeepers, and then general consumers, became dismissive of surf
brands selling poor-quality, mass-market goods. Fading cool factor diluted marketing campaigns,
poor quality products reduced reputations, and brand saturation in shopping malls and department
stores destroyed vestiges of rarity value. As sales and profit margins declined, debts spiralled to
unmanageable levels. Subcultural values ultimately limited the mass-market penetration of
surfing brands, illustrating the unstable relationships between subcultural enterprises, brand
value, and corporatised growth.
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2. A geographical political economy of subcultural brands
Economic geographers increasingly scrutinise the socio-spatial contexts of capitalist brands and
branding (Pike 2009; Tokatili 2014; Crewe 2017). At the heart of this emergent research program
are questions about how brands and their connected geographic and social relations create
meaning and value that is circulated and scaled through the work of various actors (designers,
makers, marketers, retailers, end-consumers). Historical analysis of brands has helped develop a
stronger understanding of the connections between branded objects and the social relations that
laden them with meaning and value (Gibson and Warren 2014). Research has also revealed how
contemporary brands powerfully direct where and how commodities are designed, made, valued,
circulated and exchanged (Moor 2007; Pike 2009; Crewe 2017). In hyper-competitive retail
markets brands must create value and legitimacy, while ensuring transferability across time and
space. Brands and branding practices thus involve both material and immaterial elements (Pike
2015). Branded products are commodities represented by a price paid by consumers. At the same
time brands elicit emotional and embodied responses from consumers as their products are
marketed and become identified as signifiers of quality, social status, taste, and meaning (Crewe
2003; Pike 2015).
This geographical scholarship has advanced understandings of the power of place in relation
to brand value, and revealed the multiscalar lives of brands themselves (Jackson 2004; Pike 2015;
Crewe 2017). Nevertheless, some themes remain underdeveloped. These include limited analysis
of the actions and agency of consumers who co-create brands (from their genesis in local places
to global ubiquity) and contribute to their longer-run market fate (Crewe 2003; Hracs et al. 2013).
Below, the role of consumers who co-create and co-destroy brands is discussed. Looming even
larger as an overlooked theme in research on the geographies of branding is the role of
subcultural origins, meanings, and values. Despite the commercial potency of subculture (from
gaming and grunge music to surfing and sci-fi), economic geographers have rarely extended
analytical focus to the intersection of subcultural activities, brands and place. We contribute to
the economic geography of brands and branding by taking subcultures seriously as a source of
enterprise formation, semiosis, value creation, and profit-making. Our focus on surfing-based
enterprises offers insights into the market potential of subcultural enterprises, and the limits to
growth for such brands and branded products.
To this task, we bring a conceptual approach from geographical political economy (GPE),
with a focus on the market shape of commodity producing brands (Polanyi 1977), and how the
‘spatialities of capitalism co-evolve with its economic processes… increas[ing] agents’
uncertainty and the likelihood of unintended consequences’ (Sheppard 2011: 319). Further
influence stems from cultural political economy that explicitly attends to the process of semiosis
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or ‘meaning-making’ (Jessop and Sum 2010: 445; Hudson 2012), and subcultural theory – a
pursuit of sociology and cultural studies seldom incorporated into economic geography (Lange
and Burkner 2015). This conceptual synthesis helps analyse how subcultural origins give rise to
capitalist enterprises with certain characteristics and accumulation pathways (cf. O’Neill and
Gibson-Graham 1999), generating opportunities for brand value creation and large profits but
also unleashing inherent contradictions that limit global homogenisation and undermine longerterm corporate stability (cf. Harvey 2014). We demonstrate how values emanating from a
subculture intertwine with brand formation, market imperatives, and processes of capital
accumulation. This linking of the subcultural and capitalistic spawned contradictions, as
enterprises grew, became iconic brands trading on authenticity, expanded globally, and took on
the profile of financialised transnational corporations. In short, surf capitalism emerged through
the evolution of a distinctive ‘market shape of things’ (Polanyi 1977: xl) intimately linked to
surfing subculture (Lawler 2012), accumulation pathways pursued by enterprises, and their
subsequent over-reach within globalised and financialised circuits of capital.1
Surfing’s subcultural values – emphasising local origins, authenticity, and scene participation
– delivered opportunities for commodification, brand formation, value creation and accumulation
(Lawler 2012). But also, critically, the same subcultural values unleashed deeper contradictions
when enterprises fully embraced the logics of global, corporate capitalism (public listing, product
standardisation, market saturation). We connect with recent geographical political economy
analyses of brands and retailing (Pike 2015; Crewe 2017), while incorporating insights from
subcultural theory. The subcultural origins of surf brands and their particular accumulation
pathways are crucial to fully explaining the character of enterprise formation, brand value,
subsequent contradictions and collapse. In theorising subcultural enterprises, we elide stable,
rational or homogenous conceptions of firms (cf. O’Neill and Gibson-Graham 1999). Rather,
subcultural enterprises are commercial entities trading on value that arises from a brand’s origin
narratives in distinctive socio-spatial scenes. They encapsulate dynamic power relations,
competing representations and contradictory narratives between actors: executives, workers,
politicians and consumers. We illustrate with examples of competing narratives, values and
contestation among founding entrepreneurs and later corporate executives that shaped subcultural
enterprise formation, market expansion and eventual failure.
In describing the ‘market shape’ for surf capitalism, we also draw upon multidisciplinary
literatures concerned with meanings and processes that commodify and marketise subculture.
Subcultures are formed by people who pursue a common passion, share peculiar codes of dress
and language, and interact socially in physical or online spaces (Pearson 1979; Thornton 1995;
Cova et al. 2007). A significant thread of scholarship has traced subcultures as social formations.
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With origins in the ‘Birmingham School’ of cultural studies in the 1970s (cf. Hall and Jefferson
1975), subcultural theory had developed from studies of punk, rave and heavy metal music
scenes, which espoused countercultural stances (Pearson 1979; Cova et al. 2007). Distinctive
values influence how meaning is generated within subcultures, which frequently operate as sociospatial ‘scenes’ with strong connections to particular places (increasingly mediated by internet
technologies), within which participation is policed by gatekeepers (McRobbie 1998). Credibility
is paramount. Counter-cultural attitudes inform shared practices, behaviours and spatial
preferences. Distinctive dress codes, gender relations, social mores and language emerge, with
the presentation of the self-paramount to acceptability and the policing of in-group/out-group
boundaries (Thornton 1995; Anderson 2016). Social relationships and knowledge of trends and
key local sites become essential to participation and credibility.
As sign values became increasingly relevant to market strategies (Lash and Urry 1994),
subcultures offered visual cues and cultural meanings for commodity production and marketing;
their ‘look’ and ‘cool factor’ incorporated into television shows and mainstream advertising
campaigns. Palmås (2014: 1301) argues that subcultures such as surfing, ‘based on subterranean
values’, have become drivers of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Within capitalist markets
subversive values and virtues become imperatives for profit-making. Subcultural language, visual
codes and signifiers of place and ‘authenticity’ provide options for advertisers to sell everything
from soft drinks to real estate (Warren and Gibson 2014).
Multiplication of subcultural scenes across countries (Usher and Kerstetter 2015), and
growing internet mediation, have also created opportunities for global niche marketing linked to
origin stories. Brands stemming from ‘authentic’ local roots (e.g. Seattle record labels, L.A. street
fashion) internationalise sales by leveraging credibility and cachet associated with their
geographic origins, and ‘grass-roots’ participation in the subculture. Goods sold through
subcultural enterprises constitute not only necessary equipment for participation (e.g. surfboards,
skateboards, electric guitars), but emblems of loyalty and affiliation to brands and wider
subculture. In time, many such enterprises, growing from local origins to trade through global
(niche) networks, branched out into other product lines – t-shirts, shoes, sunglasses – where the
logo, place association, and related subcultural cachet, proved extremely profitable.
Surfing is one of the more enduring, and lucrative, subcultures. With origins in Hawai’i, and
subsequent growth of the subculture in the United States, Australia, Brazil, Central America,
Japan and elsewhere, surfing has consistently espoused subterranean values (Palmås 2014; Usher
and Kerstetter 2015). Surfers embrace an oceanic ‘culture of risk’ (Walton and Shaw 2016: 1),
and express non-conformist, antithetical attitudes towards the usual beacons of rational economic
behaviour: a stable job, private property ownership, personal wealth creation (Warren and Gibson
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2014). Yet, surfing subculture entered mainstream popular culture in the United States and was
intensively commodified from the 1960s (Lawler 2012). We analyse the manner in which waves
of commodification appropriated surfing’s countercultural values, while the subculture’s appetite
for risk spawned accumulation pathways for nascent enterprises (in time becoming corporate
giants). In the extant literature on the commodification of surfing subculture, little
acknowledgement is given to how subcultural values become incompatible with, and indeed
destructive of, corporate growth models. Geographical and sociological scholarship is exploring
the phenomenon of localism within surfing subcultures (Usher and Kerstetter 2015), but how
such values contradict the increasingly global, homogenising market saturation of brands
emanating from local surfing origins, remains underexplored. We extend such scholarship by
focusing on brand authenticity, origin narratives and accumulation pathways arising from
subcultural origins and the inherent contradictions and limits of subcultural brands.

3. Surfing subcultures: revisiting origin narratives
Surfing originated with Hawaiians who since approximately 800AD have used specialised boards
to ride waves to shore (Finney and Houston 1996). From initial contact, Western colonisers of
Hawai‘i typecast surfing as a subversive activity, considering it a hindrance to establishing the
institutions of Christianity and capitalism (Walker 2011). Hawaiian society was perceived ‘as
antithetical to the European developments of Christianity, capitalism, and predatory
individualism as any society could have been’ (Trask 1996: 4). For Hawai‘i to be rendered a
landscape of private enterprise and profit via expansion of sugar and pineapple plantations,
‘antithetical’ values, embodied by surfing needed recalibrating. Because American capitalists
required commodified local labour throughout the nineteenth century, surfing – seen as risky,
‘distracting’, lackadaisical – was actively discouraged.
Annexation by the U.S. in 1898, and concerted marketing of the islands as a trade,
tourism, and migration destination, resulted in various aspects of Hawaiian culture – hula,
surfing, ukulele playing – being subject to exoticised commodification (Imada 2012). Surfing
provided ready-made sensual imagery for a burgeoning colonial tourist gaze. Demand quickly
developed for surfing among tourists and foreign immigrants permanently settling in Hawai‘i.
Boosters of Hawai‘i such as Alexander Hume Ford also began using surfing imagery (in
newspaper and magazine advertisements) to promote land sales, hotels, and aloha spirit
(Warshaw 2010). In the early twentieth century, Hawaiian surfers George Freeth and Duke
Kahanamoku embarked on extended tours of the U.S. mainland and Australia, providing surfing
demonstrations to public beach-goers (Warren and Gibson 2014). In southern California Abbot
Kinney and Henry Huntington used surfing demonstrations by the Hawaiians to promote private
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railway services, hotels and coastal housing developments (Warren and Gibson 2014). After
World War II, surfing scenes in Hawai‘i, Australia’s east coast and America’s west coast
developed a more visible presence. Surfing emerged as a subculture defined by risky behaviour,
and the unique dress, language and style of its members (cf. Pearson 1979). Because surfers spent
long periods of time at the beach rather than a workplace, they attracted social controversy
(Lawler 2012). Surfers rejected conventional social values of discipline and a stable job.
According to Booth (2005) surfers were typecast by print media as ‘dole-bludging
troublemakers’ and ‘jobless junkies roaming beaches’. Surfing courted and celebrated a
reputation as an audacious and oppositional practice.
Despite rejecting mainstream values the subculture quickly popularised. Surfing had youthful
exuberance, a laid-back lifestyle, distinctive music, sunny beaches, and suntanned bodies. An
oppositional subculture provided advertisers and media industries with a potent commercial blend
of ‘youth cool’ and sun-kissed imagery. Hence by the early 1960s there was:
A popular obsession with all things surf... Surf music, surf clothing, even surfboards on the
roof of cars in landlocked middle America – the kids couldn’t get enough of the surf lifestyle,
and Hollywood, the music industry, and the new surfboard and surf wear companies couldn’t
serve it up quickly enough. And with every magnification of the surf image in American pop
culture, the number of actual surfers increased exponentially. (Lawler 2012: 2)
Surfers set themselves apart by routinely rejecting mainstream economic notions of work,
ambition and routine. Nonetheless, hedonistic visual imagery combined with surfing’s physical
emblems afforded new opportunities to commoditise and profit from the subculture.

4. Local origins: the formation and rise of the ‘Big Three’ surf brands
Initial popular interest in surfing benefitted equipment and hardware manufacturers. In the 1960s
commercial surfboard factories multiplied in coastal towns where surfing was widely practiced:
San Clemente and Santa Cruz in California, O‘ahu’s North Shore, and Sydney’s Northern
Beaches, Torquay on the Victorian coast, and Queensland’s Gold Coast in Australia. Factories
were typically small enterprises, employing a handful of workers and selling boards to mostly
local customers. Labour was drawn from within local surfing scenes with the best local surfers
often given jobs designing and marketing surfboards, ensuring a level of foot traffic into retail
showrooms (Warren 2014). High level of embeddedness within local surfing subculture
underpinned financial viability. A craft-based, manual labour process evolved, with restricted
production volumes, tight margins and limited capacity to expand markets. The market dynamics
of surfboard manufacturing were also influenced by the physical geography of local surf breaks
with board designs matched to both riders and characteristics of local waves.
9

From surfboard factories, limited in market size, emerged a series of standalone surfwear
enterprises. The earliest were California-based O’Neill (1952) and Hang Ten (1960); start-ups
from enthusiastic surfers seeking to generate income in support of surfing lifestyles (Warshaw
2010). Across the Pacific and emerging from the small Australian town of Torquay, were surf
labels that would become multi-billion dollar international brands (cf. Stewart et al. 2008). By the
late 1960s, Torquay was a hub for surfing with numerous high-quality breaks (notably Bells
Beach). In 1968, Torquay surfers Brian Singer and Doug ‘Claw’ Warbrick successfully pitched
their idea for a surfboard business to investors in Melbourne. A small loan was used to start Rip
Curl, named after the surfing term ‘ripping the curl’. Initially Singer and Warbrick focused
attention on custom surfboards, establishing subcultural credibility for their fledgling enterprise.
The localised customer-base provided the owners with modest incomes, but ample surfing time.
Around the same time, fellow Victorian surfer Alan Green developed an idea for producing
warmer, user-friendly surfing suits. After completing several prototypes, Green met with Singer
and Warbrick at Rip Curl and pitched his idea for a wetsuit company. Warbrick and Singer
recognised a market for well-designed surfing wetsuits, ‘made BY surfers FOR surfers’ (Stewart
et al. 2008: 211), and began production in 1969. With limited inventory Rip Curl branded
neoprene suits were supplied to a select number of surfboard factories, and a dozen or so surf
retail stores (selling boards, boardshorts, and t-shirts) scattered along Australia’s east coast.
During the 1980s Rip Curl expanded into the United States, Europe, and South America
issuing spatially restricted brand licenses to local surfing investors. Such licensing equated to
renting-out the ‘intangible assets’ of the brand (cf. Perrier 1998) while Rip Curl Australia
maintained control over product design and marketing. Crucial to the firm’s commercial success
was their credibility as a market leader in well-made specialised surfing wetsuits. The suits were
considered more comfortable and better performing (less restrictive and warmer) than
competitor’s products. Focusing mainly on surf hardwear, by 2008 Rip Curl enjoyed annual
international sales of more than US$400 million. From modest beginnings as a surfboard
manufacturer, the enterprise developed into the world’s largest privately-owned surf company.
In addition to its own subcultural legitimacy and market success, Rip Curl also spawned
an offshoot: Quiksilver. Alan Green began developing other surf-related products, including
surfing shorts, drawing on knowledge of wet-suit production and the Velcro method for sealing
the neck area. The prototype was comfortable and allowed a free range of movement. In time,
these new apparel items became known as ‘board-shorts’ because they were intended for surfers.
The shorts made an immediate impact with both surfers and non-surfers who wanted a more
stylish alternative to traditional swimming trunks, and to identify with surfing subculture. After
operating for a year as a division of Rip Curl, using a series of rented shops in Torquay, Green
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moved out on his own, calling the new brand ‘Quicksilver’, referencing something ‘elusive,
liquid, mercurial, changing readily’ (Quiksilver 2014: np). To differentiate the surf label from a
rock band of the same name, Green dropped the letter c.
As with Rip Curl, Quiksilver boardshorts were hand-delivered exclusively to surf shops.
The approach targeted core surfing consumers. The boardshorts could only be sourced from key
retail sites known to surfers, which enhanced rarity value. Wearing surf brands marked
consumers as different from the mainstream, and ‘in the know’ within surfing subculture.
Nevertheless, long hours on the road personally delivering board-shorts was time-consuming and
unsustainable. Australia was a sparsely populated country with a small domestic retail market. To
improve efficiency and grow the brand, Green approached another Torquay surfer, John Law,
with an offer to join Quiksilver. Law joined Quiksilver at the start of 1976 and used his personal
networks to establish distribution deals in Japan, Hawai‘i, and France. In April 1976, Law gave
visiting American pro-surfer Jeff Hakman a pair of Quiksilver shorts. Impressed with the comfort
and quick-drying ability of the board-shorts, Hakman asked to purchase a brand license to
produce, distribute, and sell Quiksilver surfwear in North America. While infamous for his drug
use, Hakman was one of the world’s best surfers competing on the international circuit. His
reputation for licentiousness and surfing ability added to Quiksilver’s credibility as a surfing
brand. After Hakman purchased the license he recruited surfer and businessman Bob McKnight,
and Quiksilver USA became the first transnational surfing enterprise.
The third surfing brand to later become a publicly listed, multinational enterprise was
Billabong. While Quiksilver and Rip Curl had their feet in the cold waters of Torquay, Billabong
originated on Queensland’s subtropical Gold Coast. Yet again, brand formation was intimately
linked to surfing subculture. Founder Gordon Merchant was a talented surfer who worked in
several Sydney surfboard factories before moving to the Gold Coast in the late 1960s. In 1973, in
partnership with his wife Rena, Merchant began designing and sewing board-shorts for Gold
Coast surfers. Unlike Torquay, where board-shorts could rarely be worn in the ocean because of
the cold water, in Queensland, surfing shorts were worn year-round. Billabong shorts were
originally made by hand, sewn together in a flat through the week and delivered to Brothers
Neilsen surf shops along the Gold Coast every Friday, in time for the busy weekend period.
Billabong quickly became popular and the Merchants diversified into T-shirts and other
‘surf-styled’ clothing. Much like Green in Torquay, Merchant personally distributed Billabong
clothing to surf shops along the east coast, restricting supply to bona-fide surf shops. Again, the
strategy affirmed the brand’s subcultural credibility. Local authenticity was crucial, as one longtime Billabong retailer explained:
Gordon asked if I would stock his range of shorts, and he had some T-shirts as well. I
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agreed. They sold pretty well. Then I mentioned he should have ‘Australia’ somewhere on
the shirt because Australian surfing was becoming a fashionable thing at this time. Soon
after that I noticed they’d put Billabong Australia ‘since 1973’ on some shirts. Those were
always the most popular... Gordon was very smart too, because he didn’t just go selling
the clothes in any old retail shop. He started out only letting surfboard shops stock the
stuff. It was hard to get. People really became stoked on the fact that surfers were the only
people wearing this gear. (interview 2013)
Other surfwear companies that entered the market sought to capitalise on the surf craze by
allowing department stores to stock masses of their products. Brands such as Hang Ten and
Ocean Pacific entered into supply agreements with department store chains, often after being
purchased by larger corporate retailers. However, strategies of market saturation consistently
failed. Selling in department and discount stores briefly led to higher unit sales but over time
falling sales prices and erosion of brand legitimacy among core surfing consumers. While
supplying exclusively to smaller, independent surf shops disciplined Billabong and Quiksilver’s
growth, the approach galvanised a strong sense of authenticity and exclusivity for each label (cf.
Hracs et al. 2013). Exclusiveness heightened rarity value and legitimacy as subcultural brands.
Good timing also played a part. By the 1980s, specialist surf shops were multiplying in
popular tourist regions and coastal towns. A surf retail network became more established and
prominent, enabling Billabong, Quiksilver, and Rip Curl to sell products in larger numbers via
distribution to specialist outlets. Markets increased while subcultural cachet remained. Enterprise
formation and accumulation strategies for the eventual ‘Big Three’ surf brands were strongly
shaped by the values, beliefs and attitudes entrenched in surfing. Clothing and apparel was hand
delivered to specialist ‘surf shops’; there were no signed contracts for supply or pricing, only
handshake agreements; there was little inventory planning; financing was sourced from friends
and family more than formal lenders, and production occurred in garage workshops with work
commitments taking a back-seat when the surf was good.
In this early phase of expansion, the Big Three remained tangibly attached to surfing;
surfers filled management positions, and they sponsored international contests and surfers. Each
brand became an iconic symbol of the surfing subcultural lifestyle. The embeddedness of each
enterprise in the subculture was critical to the phenomenal market growth experienced throughout
the 1990s and early 2000s. Subcultural enterprise formation involved trading on the credibility
associated with being early participants and innovators, leveraging signifiers of anti-mainstream
values, and maintaining clear attachments to surfing scenes. Such dynamics were pivotal for
brand identity, alongside exchange value and geographic expansion.
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5. Going global: corporatising a subculture
Throughout the 1980s, the Big Three pioneered a global subcultural accumulation strategy based
on brand licensing deals with investors and specialist distributors in overseas territories, where
surfing had grown and offered viable markets. Subcultural diffusion spawned geographic variants
with respective values of localism and credibility (Usher and Kerstetter 2015). The Australian
network of surf retailers was replicated elsewhere: in southern California, Hawai’i, South Africa,
South America and beyond (Figure 1). Global expansion of surf brands took a particular ‘market
form’. Licensing agreements allowed original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outside
Australia to make and market branded products. Australian parent companies controlled
trademarking and IP. Growth was secured by strategic international niche marketing, tapping into
surf shops with connections to respective local surf scenes (e.g. Hobie and Golden Breed in
California), coupled with sponsorship of world tour surfers and events. Beyond being useful for
surfing, branded products traded through international niche retail networks, encouraged
subcultural performances and identities through their marketing (Anderson 2016).
< Figure 1 about here >
From a global subcultural network, the Big Three moved beyond selling to surfers in
popular surfing regions. Retail activities expanded geographically, and demographically.
Enjoying growing personal wealth but still embodying surfing’s risk-taking ethos, the founding
surfer-entrepreneurs’ ambitions grew, targeting the more generic ‘outdoor leisure’ market. In this
they were joined by other corporate surf-related brands such as Volcom (now owned by luxury
goods conglomerate Kering) and Hurley (now owned by Nike). To raise capital Quiksilver listed
publicly on the NASDAQ in 1986 (transferring to the NYSE in 1998), deliberately choosing
higher-end stores such as Nordstrom to increase markets in the U.S. and Europe. Numerous
flagship stores were also opened in major city centres away from beachside retail districts.
Importantly, new executives and managers were recruited from outside surfing
subculture. Bernard Mariette, previously an executive at Marks and Spencer and general manager
of cosmetics giant L’Oreal, was hired by Quiksilver in 1994 as Vice-President (Europe),
promoted to European President in 1999, and Global President in 2001. Mariette oversaw rapid
retail expansion, brand acquisitions and product diversification. In 2005, Quiksilver expanded
beyond surfing, purchasing French ski manufacturer Rossignol and Cleveland Golf Co. for
US$550 million (Warshaw 2010). Under Mariette, armies of PR experts and market researchers
worked to develop brand strategies to colonise new, unfamiliar markets (snow, hiking etc).
Quiksilver executives felt the brand had ‘outgrown surfing’ (Jarratt 2010) and to facilitate
expansion investment flowed into new ‘concept stores’ – called ‘Boardriders clubs’ – located in
high-street retail precincts in New York, London, Paris and Tokyo. In 1985, Quiksilver’s total
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sales were just $20 million, with 65% from U.S. consumers. But in 2004 they passed the $1
billion mark, selling in over 90 countries. With fully-fledged licensed divisions in Europe and
North America, branding no longer emphasised Australian roots (cf. Pike 2015). Rather
Quiksilver oriented itself as an international brand focused on the entire outdoor leisure market.
Main competitor, Billabong, was slower to diversify for two main reasons. First, the brand
failed to ‘crack’ the U.S. market until the late 1980s. Second, early acquisitions focused on
brands with similar subcultural roots (e.g. Von Zipper sunglasses, Element skateboards). Such
acquisitions didn’t threaten Billabong’s subcultural credibility, rather ‘strengthened it around the
edges and created new platforms for growth’ (Jarratt 2010: 224). In time however, Billabong
followed Quiksilver in becoming a global corporate firm, acquiring assets, debt-funding
expansion and opening a similar network of flagship stores in world cities. In August 2000,
Billabong listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, in a A$440 million float, and became more
aggressive with its market strategy. Executives pursued vertical integration, buying-up suburban
shopping mall retailers (e.g. Surf, Dive & Ski and Jetty Surf) to improve distribution, and moving
into online retail by acquiring swell.com and SurfStitch. By 2011 Billabong’s integration and
acquisition strategy reached its apogee, with 639 retail outlets and a portfolio of a dozen other
surf-related brands. Expansion was debt-financed from the standard institutional channels
(HSBC, Bank of America Meryll Lynch and Commonwealth Bank), exposing Billabong to
greater liabilities and risk.
Initially, increasing debt levels for both publicly listed subcultural brands were serviced
by healthy sales growth. Between 1995 and 2000 Quiksilver Europe alone averaged 32% annual
growth. Even after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Billabong’s sales from ‘chain stores’ grew
from $288 million in 2009 to $618 million by 2011. As each brand went public, accumulation
strategies locked into a particular form of market expansion. Returning profits to shareholders
meant having to constantly increase sales volumes and market share in wider youth fashion and
sports sectors, saturating markets and extending well beyond subcultural origins.
Production also internationalised, generating divisions of labour in ways typical of large,
non-surfing fashion firms (cf. Merk 2011). For instance, in the mid-2000s Quiksilver restructured
operations to ensure design centres in America, Europe, Australia, and Japan ‘developed and
shared designs and concepts that are globally consistent’ (Quiksilver Annual Report 2010: 3). In
2009, some 84% of its apparel, footwear, accessories, and hard-good products ‘were purchased or
imported as finished goods from suppliers principally in China, Korea, Hong Kong, India,
Vietnam and other parts of the Far East, but also in Mexico, Turkey, [and] Portugal’ (Quiksilver
Annual Report 2010: 6). At its height, Quiksilver had 9,600 employees globally, with union
representation among the workforce virtually non-existent. Likewise, by 2009 some of
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Billabong’s strongest sales growth across its 2,600 retailers was in countries without realistic
possibility of surfing in the ocean (e.g. Germany and Austria).
Despite maintaining private ownership, Rip Curl continued to share similarities with the
two public enterprises, particularly in terms of fragmenting and outsourcing production of
branded products. Rip Curl’s Asia-Pacific CEO Stephen Kay revealed that:
Most of our goods are made by third parties – manufacturers from Morocco through to
China. We own a very large wet suit manufacturing facility in Chiang Mai in Thailand
which is the largest single employer in the Rip Curl world [650 employees]. And we
maintain a very small wet suit factory in Australia that produces maybe half of 1% of our
total requirements. Other than that, it’s pretty much all made overseas with China as our
Number one supplier. (interview 2009)
Signalling a shift in brand identity, Rip Curl no longer viewed itself as a maker of surfwear, but a
‘marketing company’. Each of the Big Three emphasised more generic global branding of their
products, rather than connections to local surfing subcultures. Rip Curl’s Stephen Kay elaborated:
Trying to be a global brand with regional sensitivities can be a real challenge. We set
about standardising formats and the use of brand and logo around the world and having
more of a global team of athletes, a global events platform. When I arrived, there was
very little globalisation in that area and nine years later we have quite a high level of
globalisation and a lot more guidelines in place. (interview 2009)
Dramatic international expansion and market saturation moved the surfing industry well beyond
its countercultural, ‘back of the van’ roots. The industry became characterised by complex
production and distribution networks, far-reaching marketing campaigns, and transnational
corporations with interests outside the subculture, in more general ‘outdoor lifestyle’ markets.
What corporate management of the Big Three ignored was that each brand remained dependent
on subcultural legitimacy for meaning and value creation (Wood et al. 2016). Surfing subculture
underpinned brand identity and heritage and ultimately limited global market saturation.

6. Market failure: the collapse and limits to subcultural enterprises
The corporate collapse of surf brands followed, but wasn’t wholly precipitated by, the GFC. It
was the interaction between depressed consumer spending in the wake of the GFC and the loss of
subcultural authenticity among those same consumers, which sealed the fate of Quiksilver and
Billabong. Even though surfers by now constituted a smaller percentage of overall sales, they
remained the key cultural gatekeepers conferring (or in this case, destroying) brand credibility.
Once trend-setting surfers abandoned the brands, in time general non-surfing consumers
followed.
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There were earlier signals of vulnerability. For many insiders, public listing was a key
threshold: ‘That was the turning point for sure. Now we had shareholders to appease. The biggest
thing became growth at all costs. In pursuing that [growth] we lost touch with our core
consumers: surfers’ (Quiksilver design manager, interview 2014). After listing, Quiksilver’s debtto-capital ratios gradually worsened. In 2004, Quiksilver’s revenue passed the US$1 billion mark,
with total debt at US$400 million. By 2007, sales had increased to US$2.4 billion, but overall
debt had also ballooned to US$1.7 billion (figure 2). Even before the GFC impacted consumer
spending, Quiksilver executives were desperately seeking a buyer for formerly acquired
Rossignol and Cleveland Golf Co. (due to low profitability). The financial crisis merely brought
matters to a climax. After 18 months of negotiation Quiksilver executives sold Rossignol and
Cleveland Golf Co. in November 2008 for a combined US$169 million; losing US$381 million in
the deal. By 2009 Quiksilver’s annual interest bill on debts passed US$100 million, and credit
agency Moody’s added it to a watch list of companies most likely to default. Corporate
restructuring commenced, involving 1,400 redundancies, wage freezes, a 15% cut to executive
salaries and closure of 50 stores. Still, Quiksilver posted losses for a further six years. When the
company filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in 2015, liabilities totalled US$1.2 billion and assets
just US$922 million.
< Figure 2 and 3 about here >
Billabong also faced financial wipe-out (figure 3). Between 2005 and 2012 retail acquisitions
increased total debt by 330% (to A$1.05 billion). In 2010 Billabong’s market value was still
estimated at A$6 billion, but three years later had fallen to only A$272 million. After recording a
third straight annual loss in 2014 (A$233 million) a U.S. private equity consortium, (Oaktree
Capital Management, Bank of America, Centerbridge Partners) acquired a controlling stake in
Billabong, with asset stripping and company break-up appearing highly likely.
The role of non-surfing executives in the collapse was significant. Each of the Big Three
brands became dominated by corporate class executives with no surfing background. For
example, Billabong was targeted by Matthew and Scott Perrin, notorious Australian corporate
raiders, property developers and ‘racetrack touts’ (Jarratt 2010: 207). Other CEOs included
Launa Inman, former head of Target and Officeworks retail chains, and Neil Fiske, a Harvard
Business School graduate (and non-surfer) and former boss of Bath & Bodyworks. Power
struggles within the Big Three also saw corporate executives oust board members and mid-level
managers with surfing legitimacy. In 2013 Quiksilver USA founder-surfer Bob McKnight was
replaced as CEO by ex-Nike executive and former head of Disney Consumer Products, Andy
Mooney. At Billabong, Inman ousted 20-year company veteran (and well-known surfer) Derek
O’Neill. When corporate balance sheets worsened, executives became increasingly beholden to
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shareholders, Wall Street investment banks, and private equity consortiums. During investor
earnings calls, such actors showed no interest in surfing per se, and fixated on improving
investment returns through lowering production costs and expanding retail distribution. Key
decision-makers for each enterprise were not subcultural participants and lacked an
understanding of the brand’s core consumers who co-created success and underpinned the value
of branded products in highly competitive general retail markets.
With values pertaining to surfing replaced with imperatives of market share and growth, the
corporatised, multinational brands lost meaningful connections to subcultural origins. As one
former Billabong employee put it: ‘we completely sold out. That’s the reality. Surfers don’t want
to wear the gear anymore. Sooner or later the broken connections eat away the relevance and
value of the brand… once that relevance is gone, you can’t easily get it back.’ (interview 2014).
Now controlled by non-surfers, Billabong and Quiksilver sought acquisitions, market saturation
and product homogenisation, but in the process rarity value, subcultural credibility and place
association were eroded. While core surfing consumers effectively co-created the popularity and
value of Quiksilver and Billabong they also played a key role co-destroying them.

6.1 ‘Selling out’: the loss of subcultural credibility
Whereas earlier processes of commodifying surfing involved surfers directing market and
branding strategies (as start-up entrepreneurs emerging from within the subculture), the surf
mega-brands fell under the control of non-surfing executives who distanced themselves from core
consumers. The international successes of the Big Three owed much to their subcultural
legitimacy and association with iconic surfing places. Such connections afforded brands
significant credibility among ‘core’ surfing consumers, lost in the wake of corporatisation,
appointment of mainstream retail executives, increasing involvement of global investment banks,
and the necessity to abide market imperatives.
Interviews with corporate executives, post-collapse, support this argument. Executives slowly
became aware of the need to ‘reconnect with core consumers’:
It's not just about buying the product. It's also about the whole ability to access
information regarding the sport that they [consumers] are passionate about. People want
to be able to go on to a Billabong site and find out when the waves are going to be up.
They want to be able to go onto the site and see the actual surfing taking place in Tahiti.
This is all about the experience. It's all about making them feel part of the tribe, and that's
what we need to work on [getting back]. (CEO Launa Inman, shareholders call 2012)
Despite recognising a need to ‘focus on the authentic core’, Billabong’s financial haemorrhaging
continued. Compelled to deliver shareholder returns, market imperatives of geographic
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expansion, economies of scale and homogenised designs for efficient supply chains were
prioritised. Opening new markets and saturating them with branded products was an inevitable
strategy to produce figures on volume and sales that calmed panicked investors. The trouble was,
such strategies transgressed what we argue were real limits to subcultural enterprises: limits
informed by values of credibility, rarity, and a genuine connection to surfing people and places.
An instructive example involves Billabong’s market strategy in South Africa. In the early
2000s Billabong achieved considerable success in South Africa after founder Gordon Merchant
licensed Cheron Kraak to design, manufacture and sell Billabong clothing via her network of 16
independent surf shops. In 2006 Kraak helped Billabong win a ‘Khuza’ fashion award as South
Africa’s most popular female youth brand. A large manufacturing facility near the famous waves
of Jeffrey’s Bay employed 220 local workers who followed a workplace routine typical of
subcultural enterprises:
We have a great policy at work; when the surf pumps, we go surfing! We are a surf
company, and besides, it’s no use trying to keep them indoors when Supers [iconic surf
break] is 6 to 8 feet! As long as they make up their time, it’s all good. (Cheron Kraak,
interview 2006)
Nevertheless, after consolidating global operations, Billabong bought back the South
African licence in 2007. Local design teams were merged into global production networks that
supplied Billabong’s growing portfolio of mall and main street retail stores with generic designs.
Localism, central to the values of surfing (Beaumont and Brown 2015), was overridden by the
desire from corporate headquarters to standardise global product to achieve efficiency gains.
Feeding increasingly standardised designs for mass markets were the global production
networks that undermined the authenticity associated with surfing’s place origins (cf. Yeung
2014). Billabong may have had ‘Australia - since 1973’ as part of their logo on t-shirts and shorts
but ‘Made in China’ on the inside label sent a message to surfers that the brand, once a proud
export of the Australian surfing scene, had become another victim to cheap, offshore production.
Quality demonstrably suffered – a critical issue to surfers for whom performance in the ocean,
and durability amidst exposure to saltwater and sun, were paramount. T-shirts and board-shorts
instead looked like any other ‘fast fashion’ clothing, and simply didn’t last. Meanwhile Rip Curl
was the subject of damning national headlines revealing Chinese subcontractors’ use of
indentured North Korean labour in producing t-shirts and apparel (McKenzie and Baker 2016).
The notion of ‘selling-out’ thus epitomised the feelings of surf industry figures
interviewed for the research. As one former Billabong employee put it:
You could see the fall coming. We started standardising our designs as the execs were
obsessed with market expansion. Shareholders want dividends. A lot of us just shook our
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heads: ‘this is what it looks like to sell-out’. We completely lost our roots. How can a
brand be [part of] surfing culture and become this capitalist monster acquiring indie
brands, opening swanky stores in New York and taking production to the cheapest
factories in places uninterested in surfing?
As the Big Three expanded and dispersed into numerous products, disenchanted industry insiders
felt a sense of grounded connection to subcultural roots was lost. As one retailer concisely
summarised, ‘they lost their soul in greed’.
Unsurprisingly, products sold by the Big Three became increasingly unfashionable among
younger surfing consumers. As surf writer Phil Jarratt (2010: 211) argued, ‘[what] pissed a lot of
people off was the fact that they [the Big Three] had such muscle in the market that they could
dominate virtually everything they touched, and homogenise it. An increasing number of surfers
didn’t want to be homogenised. It wasn’t in their genes’. Yet beholden to investors and
shareholders, executives focused on market share and growing revenue. With diminishing returns
from traditional surf retailers, expansion was instead pursued by supplying to department stores.2
Leveraging heritage in surfing subculture Quiksilver supplied to Macy’s. Billabong soon
followed, selling via discount outlets such as TJ Maxx in North America and El Corte Inglés in
Western Europe. By 2013 sales from such ‘close-out channels’ (heavily discounted products sold
in department stores), comprised nearly 20% of Quiksilver and Billabong’s annual revenues.
When asked about the department store strategy and potential for it to dilute the brand’s
reputation, then Billabong CEO, Launa Inman, confessed:
Yes, they [‘close-out’ sales] are looking a little higher than we would like… but we know that
and we're looking to actually reduce that. But that is a result of merchandise, when we've
been overstocked, that we've had to clear excess inventory. (interview 2012)
Excess stock was indicative of falling orders as demand fell for branded Billabong and Quiksilver
products. Discounting cut into profit margins, and sales and market share for Quiksilver and
Billabong worsened. For example, despite the global surf retail market expanding by 17% in the
post-GFC period (2009-2016) to reach US$13 billion (Global Industry Analysts 2016), sales for
Billabong and Quiksilver declined by 35% and 32% respectively. Equally significant to macroeconomic conditions was eroding credibility of each brand among surfers and surfing subculture.
Facing growing debts, falling sales and profit margins, corporate executives within the
Big Three belatedly admitted errors in seeking endless global expansion and standardisation at
the expense of subcultural connections. Reporting to shareholders in 2012 Billabong conceded
abandoning its subcultural roots had eroded the value of the brand:
When Billabong started in 1970s it was unique, it was one of the first to market and it had
phenomenal heritage and great performance. It was a differentiated product, but… we just
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need to make sure that we focus once again on what made this Company great. It’s all
about the product and it's about ensuring that you understand what the consumers want…
What we now need to do is to use that information better. (Launa Inman)
Likewise, in 2011 Quiksilver’s (then) chief executive Bob McKnight belatedly recognised the
need to ‘reinforce our heritage and authenticity to the consumer’ (Hamanaka 2011: 65). After
McKnight was himself ousted to make way for an ex-Nike/Disney CEO, the company attempted
to retrieve credibility within surfing through Pierre Agnes, a former French surfing champion and
critic of earlier corporate expansionist approaches. While corporatised surf brands have attempted
to ‘re-focus on the authentic core’ and ‘re-orient… towards building strong global brands that are
locally responsive’ (Billabong 2013: np), such language merely indicates the deep contradictions
of subcultural enterprises (cf. Harvey 2014). There are inherent tensions between market
imperatives (distribution networks, inventory, margins and sales volumes), and subcultural
authenticity, legitimacy and place connections.
Of the Big Three, Rip Curl is now faring best. After re-investment in wetsuit production,
a core product for surfers, Rip Curl announced a net profit of A$23 million for 2015/2016 (on
sales of A$446 million). Affirming the importance of subcultural authenticity and credibility in
shaping market performance, Rip Curl’s CFO Tony Roberts explained: ‘we are more of a core
surf brand than either key competitor. They both grew bigger than us but in growing bigger they
stretched into that non-core [surfing] market more than we have… we have been very true to our
roots in terms of our core products. For example, our wetsuits are our champion products and
have been since the company was founded’. Rip Curl’s profit turnaround, captured by their
slogan ‘Made by Surfers for Surfers’, has been underpinned by a focus on branded products
essential for surfing participation. Straight-jacketed by shareholders and private equity, the future
of the two wholly-corporatised brands is much less certain. At the time of writing, Billabong had
announced another $77.1 million loss for 2017, with combined losses since 2011 totalling A$1.46
billion. Meanwhile, Quiksilver emerged from bankruptcy re-organisation in February 2016 with
legal protections enabling dissolution of US$520 million in debt. The brand has since been
acquired by private equity firm Oaktree Capital Management, who delisted and moved Quiksilver
under a new corporate structure branded: ‘Boardriders, Inc’. The re-branding strategy, according
to the firm will help them ‘pivot from restructuring to growth’ by re-animating Quiksilver’s
‘boardriding culture and heritage’ (Oaktree Capital Press Release 2017: np). Marketing rhetoric
won’t, however, resolve the underlying problem of lost subcultural credibility. Rebuilding the
collapsed subcultural enterprise will be untenable without also rebuilding subcultural legitimacy
among the brand’s core consumers: surfers.
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7. Conclusions
Geographers are increasingly exploring the social and spatial contexts of capitalist brands,
including how place and consumer associations shape market strategies and commercial fortunes
(Jackson 2004; Pike 2015; Crewe2017). This article has examined one underexplored source of
brand value creation within contemporary capitalism: subcultures. With subcultural logics,
meanings, and values pervading an increasing array of consumer goods, social ‘scenes’ and
leisure activities (cf. Lawler 2012), further geographical analysis of the intersection between
subcultures, brands and branding is needed. Subcultural values of credibility, rarity, and
legitimacy now infuse a host of industries, from musical instruments and ‘maker’ scenes to
extreme sports and tourism experiences (McRobbie 1998; Booth 2005; Lange and Burkner 2015).
A growing range of markets find their ‘shape’ being formed by semiotic meanings and identityaffirming qualities (Scott 2014). Commercial opportunities will arise for brands offering social
distinction, product quality, and connections to subcultures and their active consumer groups.
Across such examples, tensions between narratives of subcultural and place origins, and
marketisation, globalisation and standardisation, will play out in nuanced ways.
In the case of surf brands, subcultural meanings and values are a potent reservoir from
which commercial gains can be sourced via branded products. Commodification and
marketisation of surfing during the twentieth century benefited from the subculture’s credibility,
sun-drenched imagery and antithetical attitudes to mainstream society (Booth 2005; Lawler
2012). From informal origins, subcultural enterprises grew, and spurred by initial successes
within national and international niche retail markets, became corporatised, publicly listed
companies reliant on selling surfing to the masses. Firms expanded geographically, becoming
progressively obliged to shareholders and investment banks, locked-in to the saturation of
clothing in nondescript shopping malls and department stores. In pursuing surplus value, high
volume sales, and market share, both product quality and brand credibility declined. As each
brand was abandoned by surfing consumers, they lost subcultural legitimacy. Facing financial
ruin, they pursued high-volume, lower-cost strategies that flooded retail markets, undermining
rarity value. And once core surfers, the key trendsetters, had abandoned them, brands thereafter
lost the ‘cool’ factor upon which sales to the masses depended.
Subcultures enable pathways to distinctive enterprise formation, and influence the shape
of incipient markets. At the same time, their subversive nature also means they impart inherent
tensions and limits in the brands they spawn. Surf brands relied on leveraging authentic
subcultural roots to drive into new niche markets and achieve commercial success. But market
growth relied on, and empowered, core surfing consumers who not only co-created each brand by
(re)ascribing subcultural meanings and values, alongside product purchasing (Pike 2015), but co21

destroyed them as corporatisation and mass-market saturation eroded all vestiges of surfing
legitimacy.
Conventional explanations that the Big Three surf firms became victims to financial risk,
and the volatility of international retail markets, represent only partial accounts of collapse. Flat
consumer spending in key European and North American markets in the wake of the GFC clearly
played a role reducing revenue and eroding profit-margins on branded surf products. But we
contend an equally significant factor in brand failure was the loss of subcultural credibility and
legitimacy among surfers. As profit-seeking brands with subcultural origins, the Big Three failed
to manage the fine balance between, on the one hand, debt-funded global expansion and market
growth for shareholder dividends, and on the other hand, maintaining subcultural authenticity and
relevance to core consumers. Indeed, the latter – subcultural legitimacy – was what originally
afforded branded products high exchange value in relation to their actual utility for subcultural
participation. Rather than privileging one explanation over the other, this analysis has been
attentive to interactions between market processes and subcultural roots in explaining brand
collapse. Surf brands demonstrate that analytical attention to ascribed meanings, values, and
contradictions, and the ongoing degree to which core consumers see brands as authentic, is
critical to understanding the market shape and longer-run commercial fortunes of brands with
subcultural origins.
To be profitable, subcultural brands must leverage their credibility, authenticity and
origins within particular subcultural scenes (Driver 2011). Increasingly global networks of niche
retailing offer opportunities to expand geographically, without necessarily eroding links to
subcultural scenes and places. But over time, subcultural values of risk-taking and insouciance
stoke entrepreneurs’ inflated ambitions beyond prudent limits. Collapse in brand authenticity,
sales and financial stability ensues not just from difficult retail conditions, but from
contradictions unleashed by subsequent public listings, the growing influence of non-subcultural
executives, shareholders and investment banks, and market strategies deemed necessary to cope
with ballooning debt and to deliver profit and growth. Enterprises are drawn to increase market
share and volume, dependent on generating efficiencies through low-cost offshore production. At
the same time, rarity value of branded products is eroded and brand reputation diminished. Once
subcultural members perceive brands as ‘selling-out’, cachet and profitability is consistently
undermined. The contradictions of subcultural enterprises are shaped both by corporate
capitalism’s demand for market expansion and shareholder returns (cf. Harvey 2014), and the
meanings and values pertaining to subcultures (Driver 2011). Subcultures spawn brands with
distinctive accumulation pathways and market strategies, simultaneously unleashing inherent
tensions that limit endless mass-market expansion and the global homogenisation of branded
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products. Adopting a culturally-inflected geographical political economy approach (cf. Jessop
and Sum 2010; Scott 2014; Pike et al. 2016) has enabled the tracing of interactions between
subcultural dynamics informing brand formation and value-creation, and market strategies of
debt-financing, global expansion, standardisation, and public-listing that propel both growth and
decline. Geographers, we contend, ought to take more seriously how subcultures become a source
of profit-making enterprise, as well as subsequent corporate collapse.
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Notes
1.

2.

It’s important to distinguish between enterprise forms emanating from certain cultural and creative industries,
focused around the generation of intellectual property content (such as media and film) and those emanating
from subcultural origins, where protagonists seek to pursue commercial possibilities from within the subculture,
initially at least. In this way, record labels established by subcultural entrepreneurs may be analogous to the surf
enterprises discussed here while, for example, media and entertainment conglomerates such as News
Corporation, with no obvious subcultural origins, may not (even though they also trade in expressive, semiotic
or ‘cultural’ content).
In 2016 the total surf retail market in the U.S. was estimated at US$7.15 billion (SIMA 2017). Of this total
specialty surf stores (those with more than 50% of sales derived from surf-branded products) had 24% of the
market or US$1.72 billion. Of the revenue from ‘core’ specialty shops the sale of branded hardware for surfing
(e.g. surfboards, wetsuits, fins) comprised 34% of sales or US$584 million. By comparison department and
chain stores (e.g. Macy’s, Nordstrom) totaled 40% of the overall market for surf-branded products or US$2.86
billion. The remainder of sales was from online retailers, general fashion, and sporting and leisure stores.
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